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THE RECOGNITION OF A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT:
SOMEONE STOLE MY IDENTITY, NOW WHO IS
GOING TO PAY FOR IT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which a young husband and wife, the Smiths,
are in the process of buying their first home. They have completed the
necessary paperwork and have hired an attorney to assist them with the
closing. The Smiths have also given their current landlord notice that
they will not be renewing their lease. All that remains is for the real
estate agent to run one more quick credit check before the papers are
signed. But the sale hits a snag. The real estate agent notifies the
Smiths that their credit report came back negative and, unfortunately,
the sale will not go through.
The Smiths rush home in a panic and call their bank. After receiving
a copy of their credit report, they learn that someone has been using Mr.
Smith's name to open credit accounts. It turns out that this unknown
"identity thief" has charged thousands of dollars in Mr. Smith's name.
The Smiths contact their attorney. After many phone calls, countless
weeks, and loads of paperwork, their credit is eventually restored. In
addition, the police are fortunate enough to arrest the identity thief: an
unemployed, adult computer hacker. The identity thief used his
computer skills to exploit a security vulnerability at the Smiths' bank to
retrieve information about Mr. Smith. The thief then used this
information to open credit accounts under Mr. Smith's name.
Regrettably, despite clearing their name, it is too late for the Smiths.
The house of their dreams has been sold to someone else. They must
find a new place to live because the landlord rented their apartment to
someone else after the Smiths gave notice of departure. They have
spent thousands of dollars in attorney's fees to correct their credit
problems and have expended countless h6urs in an effort to remedy this
credit fiasco. The Smiths' attorney recommends suing the identity thief
for the harm he caused, but he mentions that there is a problem: the
identity thief has no apparent assets; therefore, they would not be able
to collect a judgment against the identity thief. Mr. and Mrs. Smith
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wonder if there is some way that they can be compensated.
Situations similar to the Smiths' situation are far too common.'
Recent estimates indicate that one in four adults have been affected by
identity theft.2 It is estimated that identity theft has cost Americans at
least five billion dollars.3 In addition, the average victim of identity theft
spends over 600 hours and $1400 fixing his credit.4 Unfortunately, the
problem is only getting worse: Identity theft has increased in recent
years.' Even though most states have laws in place that criminalize
identity theft,6 it has been difficult for identity theft victims to receive
compensation for their injuries.7 Some victims have attempted to hold
financial or credit institutions liable for the identity theft when the
institution allowed the identity thief to use the stolen information to
open bank or credit accounts.8 However, the financial institutions have
usually been able to avoid liability through various laws and court
holdings.9
The rise in identity theft is even more troubling when one considers
the ease with which information can be transferred via computers.
Before the advent of mass computer use, personal information typically
was stored on paper and easily could be secured in a file cabinet with a
lock and key. Therefore, identity thieves had to use more devious and
indirect methods to steal personal information, such as stealing mail or
digging through someone's trash.10 Today, an identity thief with the
1. See Michael Higgins, Identity Thieves, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 42.
2. See Kristen S. Provenza, Note, Identity Theft: Prevention and Liability, 3 N.C.
BANKING INST. 319, 319 n.8 (1999).
3. Ellen McCarthy, Pay Agent Aims to Curtail Identity Theft Online, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 2003, at E05.
4. Identity Theft Resource Center, Facts and Statistics (Sept. 2003), at
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/facts.shtml.
5. It is estimated that in 2002, there were 7,000,000 cases of identity theft. This is an
87.7% increase in identity theft from 2001. See Identity Theft 911, Identity Fraud Analysis of
Compelling Statistics (Aug. 2003), at http://www.identitytheft9ll.com/education/fundamentals
/idtheftstatistics.htm.
6. See Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss
Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 350-51 n.33 (2003).
7. Few states have statutes in place that require restitution by the identity thief or
provide assistance to the victim in correcting the problems caused by the identity thief.
Daniel J. Solove, Enforcing Privacy Rights Symposium: Remedying Privacy Wrongs-New
Models: Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227,
1248 (2003).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Parts II and Ill.
10. See Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial Institution's Duty of Confidentiality to
Keep Customer's Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C.
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right amount of computer knowledge can gather all of the information
he needs about an individual from the comfort of his home computer."
With the recent outbreaks of fast-spreading computer viruses that take
advantage of computer vulnerabilities, 2 one has to wonder whether the
financial institutions that hold personal information sought by identity
thieves have the requisite security measures to protect their files.13 Do
they have the necessary digital lock and key?
This Comment proposes that courts should permit victims of identity
theft to have a cause of action against financial institutions whose
negligence in establishing sufficient computer security measures allows
an identity thief to obtain the victim's personal information and use that
information to the financial detriment of the victim. To fully explore
this proposal, Part II of this Comment will provide some general
background into the concept of identity theft and other proposed
remedies to the problem. 4 Part III of the Comment will explore the
issues surrounding the recognition of the tort of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud as a cause of action for identity theft victims, 5 and in
Part IV, this Comment will explore the potential use of negligence per
se as a cause of action for identity theft victims." Finally, Part V of the
Comment will conclude that recognition of new causes of action for
identity theft victims may help to reduce the rate of identity theft by
placing more responsibility on financial institutions. 7
II. IDENTITY THEFT: BACKGROUND
To demonstrate why courts should recognize a cause of action for
DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1083 n.31-34 (2001); Provenza, supra note 2, at 323.
11. The collection of information about individuals has increased with the growth of the
Internet. Such "databases" of personal information raise privacy issues and provide identity
thieves with a potential resource. See generally James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value
in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the value of information
privacy in today's society).
12. The SoBig.F and Blaster viruses that infected computers within weeks of each other
in the summer of 2003 created mass havoc among computer users and spread to over 148
countries. Helen Cook, Email Virus Chaos; SoBig-F Grinding Internet to a Halt, THE
MIRROR, Aug. 22, 2003, at News 1, 6. It is estimated that 500,000 computers were harmed by
the Blaster virus and that the SoBig.F virus was attached to one in every seventeen emails.
Id.
13. For a wide range of statistics related to concerns about computer security at financial
institutions, see generally http://www.securitystats.com.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
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victims of identity theft, this Comment first will examine the process of
identity theft, the end result of an instance of identity theft, and why
identity theft is a growing problem. Additionally, to demonstrate why a
cause of action for identity theft victims is necessary, this Comment will
examine past and present proposals to reduce identity theft that have
been inadequate.
A. The Process of Identity Theft
An instance of identity theft "occurs when someone uses another
individual's personal information for fraudulent purposes."18 Due to the
nature of identity theft, it is often difficult for the victim to realize that
he has been victimized. 9 This is because the fruits of an identity thief's
crime take weeks, months, or even years to ripen.0 Only in certain
instances, such as when a wallet is stolen or a home is burglarized, are
potential identity theft victims aware of the possibility that their
personal information may be used for fraudulent purposes. Thus,
victims in those situations can minimize potential financial losses by
promptly canceling their credit cards and warning their banks.21
The rise in identity theft has occurred in a large part because of the
increased sophistication and anonymity of identity thieves. Some
techniques are fairly simple but still allow identity thieves to
anonymously steal personal information.22 Such techniques include
observing individuals when they enter their credit card number on a
telephone or digging through someone's trash searching for credit card
receipts. Thieves can also attempt to use a technique known as
"pretexting."'  Pretexting can occur when a thief calls a financial
institution pretending to be a customer or when a thief calls a customer
21pretending to be a financial institution. In either instance, the identitythief's goal is to solicit personal information from the caller. Another
18. McKelvey, supra note 10, at 1082.
19. See Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV.
1423,1425 (2001).
20. Id. at 1425-26.
21. See Provenza, supra note 2, at 322 n.40. In addition, under most credit card policies,
the victim of a fraudulently used credit card is responsible for only fifty dollars, regardless of
how much the thief charges on the card. Hoar, supra note 19, at 1436-37.
22. See Hoar, supra note 19, at 1426. Identity thieves can also attempt to "dumpster
dive" at places such as banks and hospitals in the hopes of discovering confidential
information. Id.
23. Id. See also Barbara Anthony, Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series, 1172 PLI/Corp 387, 393 (2000).
24. McKelvey, supra note 10, at 1083.
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growing technique for identity theft has been for identity thieves to
become employed at financial institutions and then gain access to
confidential customer information."
The most recent and troubling technique used to obtain personal
information has been the use of computers.26 With the amount of
information available on the Internet, identity thieves have a wide range
of sources to utilize to accumulate personal information. In addition,
computer hackers can attempt to gain access to the computers of
financial institutions in order to access confidential customer records.
At least one online security firm has found that "the average U.S.
company's computer security is attacked by intruders thirty times per
week., 29 Due to the increased vulnerabilities of computer systems to
hackers, government legislation has attempted to regulate the
implementation of computer network security.'
B. The Results of Identity Theft
1. Account Takeovers
Instances in which identity thieves take over existing financial
accounts are called "account takeovers."31 Account takeovers are less of
a threat to a victim's finances because the harm usually is discovered
within a short period of time, typically when the victim receives a
statement from his bank or credit card company.2 However, within that
time, the identity thief can attempt to charge purchases to the victim's
credit card, cash checks in the victim's name, or even attempt to
withdraw funds from the account directly.3
25. See id. at 1083-84.
26. See David Breitkopf, Visa, MC Get Tougher on Hackers, Data Collectors, THE
AMERICAN BANKER, Apr. 11, 2003, at 9.
27. See Solove, supra note 7, at 1255.
28. Id. at 1259.
29. Timothy H. Skinner, California's Database Breach Notification Security Act: The
First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2003), at http://Iaw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl0il
/articlel.pdf.
30. See infra Part II.E.
31. See Sovem, supra note 6, at 355.
32. See Provenza, supra note 2, at 321.
33. Id.
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2. True Name Fraud
The more potentially damaging form of identity theft is known as
"true name fraud." 3 The key difference between true name fraud and
account takeover is that with true name fraud, the identity thief opens
new bank and credit accounts in the victim's name, while account
takeover involves the use of existing bank and credit accounts only.35
Usually, in an instance of true name fraud, the identity thief will open
new accounts in the victim's name, but under a different address to
avoid alerting the victim.36 Since the victim will not know his personal
information has been stolen, it is unlikely he will discover the nature of
the crime for an extended period of time. Frequently, victims of true
name fraud do not learn of the crime until they attempt to finance the
purchase of a home or vehicle.37 It is only after the victims review their
credit reports that they learn of accounts that have been opened without
their knowledge.38
C. Why Identity Theft Occurs
The recent rise of identity theft probably can be attributed to
weaknesses in the structure in which personal information flows in
society. 9 The main weakness that identity thieves have exploited have
been the "digital dossiers" of individuals.40 These dossiers contain
personal information, including an individual's name, address, phone
number, and social security number ("SSN") and are collected by
various private and governmental organizations, such as banks, video
stores, and Department of Motor Vehicle centers. 41  Frequently, an
individual does not know how much information is stored in his digital
dossier, or who has compiled it. This makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for an individual to control access to his personal
information and, thus, limit his vulnerability to instances of identity
34. See Sovern, supra note 6, at 355.
35. Id.
36. See Provenza, supra note 2, at 320-21.
37. See Hoar, supra note 19, at 1425.
38. Id.
39. "According to the FBI, identity theft is the most rapidly growing type of white-collar
criminal activity." Solove, supra note 7, at 1244 n.71.
40. See generally Solove, supra note 7. Solove's article provides detailed information
about the architecture surrounding identity theft and potential reforms regarding how
personal information is used to reduce the opportunity for identity theft.
41. Id. at 1251-52.
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theft .2
One of the chief pieces of information desired by identity thieves is
the SSN.4 '3  Even though SSNs "were not designed to be used as...
general identifier[s],"" the widespread use of SSNs has caused them to
become just that.45 Today, an individual's SSN is his primary source for
identification for financial institutions, schools, and government
agencies. 6 Thus, identity thieves can use an individual's SSN to access
bank accounts or medical records in the hopes of finding additional
personal information.4 '7  Then, identity thieves can use this additional
information, along with the SSN, to open new bank and credit
accounts .48
Given the identity thief's desire to obtain SSNs, it is important to
discuss how those who possess SSNs handle that personal information
and digital dossiers in general. For example, an individual probably will
have to give his SSN and other personal information to a bank when he
opens a new account. Unbeknownst to the individual, the bank may end
up selling or trading its new customer's information to a third-party
institution.49 Therefore, an individual's SSN may be possessed by more
institutions than the individual would expect or know. When an
individual chooses to give his information to one institution, he may do
so because he trusts the institution or knows that it has security
measures sufficient to protect his personal information. ° However, the
security features of the institution that buys a digital dossier may be
poor or insufficient, and thus an individual may be vulnerable to
potential identity theft.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1252.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 536-49 (1998). The Privacy Act of 1974 passed
amid privacy concerns over the growing use of SSNs as general identifiers; the Act prohibited
the government from denying service to an individual for his refusal to divulge his SSN. See
Solove, supra note 7, at 1253. The Privacy Act, however, did not prohibit the use of SSNs in
the private sector. Id.
47. Komuves, supra note 46, at 536-40.
48. Solove, supra note 7, at 1253.
49. Komuves, supra note 46, at 536-37.
50. See Provenza, supra note 2, at 329. Because banks have become more aware of the
need to protect customer information, many have added high-tech security features such as
voice recognition software, fingerprinting, and other evolving measures where cost effective.
Id.
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Along with the increase of computer usage and the rise of the
Internet has come a corresponding rise in instances of network
computer hacking. 1 This is of great concern because as more financial
institutions store confidential customer information on computers that
are accessible via the Internet, it becomes possible for a hacker to gain
access to or control over customer information from the comfort of his
own home. 2 Without proper security systems in place, a financial
institution whose computer network is constantly connected is at
continuous risk of attack. 3 If financial institutions are not responsive to
the potential for computer hackers to attack their computer networks,
they risk disseminating private information of their customers.
D. Past Proposals to Reduce Identity Theft
As instances of identity theft have increased, so have the measures
taken to prevent theft or punish offenders. Generally, these measures
can be classified into four groups. The first has been for individuals to
take greater responsibility in protecting their personal information.5
The second measure is the creation of criminal statutes to punish
identity thieves.56  The third is the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA").57 And the fourth measure has been to allow civil remedies
based on claims of invasion of privacy and breach of confidentiality. 8
1. Personal Responsibility
One way to reduce identity theft is to have individuals protect their
51. A survey by Symantec reported a nineteen percent increase in the number of
network attacks over a six-month period in 2003 with an average company reporting thirty-
eight attacks per week. Mike Simons, Record Rise in Cyber Attacks (Oct. 2, 2003), at
http://www.computerweekly.com.
52. Breitkopf, supra note 26, at 9. Hacking has become so prevalent that there are over
400,000 hacking-tip web sites. Id. Some web sites even provide amateurs with step-by-step
procedures on how to break into web sites. Id.
53. See Hoar, supra note 19, at 1440. Computer protections, such as firewalls, are critical
to protect computers that are "always on" from network attacks. Id.
54. In one extreme example of hacking, a computer hacker gained access to roughly
eight million customer credit card numbers by exploiting a security vulnerability that affected
several major banks and credit card companies. David Boraks and W.A. Lee, Assessing
Damage of Processor Data Hack; Record 8 Million Cards Said Affected; No Word Yet of
Fraud, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 19, 2003, at 1.
55. See infra Part II.D.1.
56. See infra Part II.D.2.
57. See infra Part II.D.3.
58. See infra Part II.D.4.
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personal information.59  Essentially, an individual would take steps to
limit his potential vulnerability to identity thieves. For example,
documents containing personal information could be stored or disposed
of with special care.6° Small measures, such as keeping important
documents in a safe place and shredding receipts instead of simply
throwing them away, can greatly reduce the chance that identity thieves
will find personal information.61
Individuals could also take steps to protect bank and credit accounts.
Individuals can be careful when providing account information. By
confirming requests for account information, whether these requests are
via phone, mail, or email, an individual can prevent identity thieves from
gathering account information through pretexting methods.6 2
Additional precautions should be taken when providing sensitive
account information over the Internet.63 The most important precaution
is to be certain that a secure connection is provided when account
information is requested online.6' A secure connection greatly reduces
the possibility that identity thieves can hack into an individual's
connection and steal his account information without his knowledge.65
Individuals can also request annual credit reports.6 Given that a
victim of identity theft frequently does not know he is a victim, an
annual review of credit reports can alert an individual that he has been
victimized. Even though reviewing credit reports cannot prevent
identity theft from occurring, it can help to mitigate the harm and allow
the victim to begin the long, arduous process of trying to reestablish his
finances.
59. For a discussion of why keeping personal information secret cannot deter the rise of
identity theft, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft
Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89,108-14 (2001).
60. See Hoar, supra note 19, at 1438-43, for suggestions on what steps to take to
minimize the risks of identity theft.
61. Id. at 1441.
62. For information on how to avoid pretexting and other identity theft situations, see
generally Federal Trade Commission, About Identity Theft, at http://www.consumer.gov/id
theft/consumertopics-bk.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
63. For tips on how to avoid identity theft while shopping online, see MasterCard
International, Preventing Payment Card Fraud, at http://www.mastercardintl.com/docs
/s.r_consumer tips-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2005).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Solove, supra note 7, at 1249. It costs a consumer $8.50, per report, to order a credit
report from each of the three major credit reporting agencies.
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2. Criminal Statutes
Legislatures have responded to the growing number of identity theft
cases by enacting statutes to criminalize this type of theft. Until 1998,
only three states had statutes that specifically dealt with identity theft.67
Since that time, additional states have enacted identity theft statutes,
bringing the total number of states with identity theft statutes to forty-
four.' States differ in how they penalize identity theft and how they
address victims' rights. Some states treat identity theft as a felony with a
set penalty, while others vary the severity of the punishment based on
the amount of money involved.69 Additionally, some states have
incorporated victim restitution procedures into their statutes.70
In 1998, Congress addressed concerns over identity theft by passing
the Identity Theft and Deterrence Act ("ITADA").71 The ITADA
makes it a crime to "knowingly transfer[], possess[], or use[], without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet,... any unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under
any applicable State or local law., 72 Under the ITADA, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has taken a central role in identity theft
prevention.7 The FTC's goal is to "assist victims and law enforcement
by collecting and sharing information from public and private entities.,
71
One way that the FTC assists identity theft victims is by providing
victims with "step-by-step instructions on contacting the vdrious credit
reporting agencies to remove any record of the crime."75 In essence, the
FTC's role under the ITADA has been to educate consumers and
67. Id. at 1247.
68. Id.
69. For example, Florida, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey all vary their punishment of
identity theft based upon the amount of money involved in the crime. Id. Wisconsin, under
Wisconsin Statutes section 943.41(8) (2003), also varies the penalty imposed based upon the
amount of money involved in the crime.
70. California, by statute, provides victims with assistance in repairing their finances
after an instance of identity theft. Id. at 1247.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2003).
72. Id.
73. Erin M. Shoudt, Identity Theft: Victims "Cry Out" for Reform, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
339, 370-71 (2002).
74. Id. at 371. The FTC has created the Identity Theft Hotline and the Identity Theft
Clearinghouse, along with consumer education programs, as attempts to decrease incidents of
identity theft. Id. at 372-75.
75. Janice A. Alwin, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes to Work For You, 14
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 353, 364 (2002).
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victims about identity theft prevention methods, as well as to provide
consumers with assistance after an identity theft has occurred.
76
Unfortunately, there have been problems with criminal identity theft
statutes and the ITADA. The biggest problem is that law enforcement
agencies lack the resources to investigate and prosecute identity
thieves.77 Given the lack of urgency and ability for the police to catch
identity thieves, it is rare for identity thieves to be arrested.7 ' Because
arrests are infrequent, it is difficult, if not impossible, for victims to
receive restitution for their financial losses.79 Even if the identity thief is
arrested, restitution is not always possible or required." Regrettably,
the ITADA does not remedy this problem, as it "does not allow the
courts to award restitution to the victim for costs related to the identity
theft."8
3. Fair Credit Reporting Act'
Because identity thieves frequently "mislead" credit companies in
order to apply for credit in the victim's name, identity theft victims can
attempt to receive restitution from the credit companies that issued
credit to the identity thief under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"). 3  However, there are several reasons why the FCRA is
inadequate in dealing with occurrences of identity theft. '
One of the biggest obstacles in applying the FCRA to instances of
identity theft is the FCRA's short statute of limitations.85 The statute of
limitations is of concern because identity theft victims frequently
76. Id.
77. Solove, supra note 7, at 1248. Identity theft investigation requires a high degree of
specialized training and frequently ends without an arrest. In addition, police departments
have a hard time justifying the use of additional resources for an identity theft investigation
due to its white-collar criminal status. Most departments spend most of their resources
investigating violent crimes and drug offenses and have little money left to direct toward
identity theft investigations. Id.
78. Identity Theft Resource Center, Facts and Statistics, at http://www.idtheftcenter.org
/facts.shtml (last modified Feb. 15, 2004). "The average arrest rate (according to law
enforcement) is under 5% of all reported cases by victims." Id.
79. Solove, supra note 7, at 1248.
80. Id. at 1247-48.
81. Alwin, supra note 75, at 363-64.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) for the text of the FCRA.
83. Sovern, supra note 6, at 388.
84. See id. at 388-401 for an in-depth examination of how the FCRA applies to instances
of identity theft. This Comment will only briefly examine the relationship between the
FCRA and identity theft.
85. Id. at 389. The FCRA has a two-year statute of limitations. Id.
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discover that they have been victimized only after the claim has
expired." Therefore, few victims of identity theft have an opportunity
to utilize the FCRA."' Another problem with the FCRA is its scope.
The FCRA allows claims only against credit reporting agencies and
cannot be used against financial institutions, which are frequently
involved in instances of identity theft."
Even if an identity theft victim is able to bring a claim under the
FCRA, the remedies offered by the FCRA are limited and usually do
not provide adequate relief. The main reason for this is that the FCRA
is applicable in only certain situations.89 Unfortunately, these situations
do not cover most instances of identity theft. For the situations in which
the FCRA can be applied, the protection offered by the FCRA to
creditors makes the chances of success of a private claim slim.9
Therefore, credit agencies have little incentive to increase security
measures that could insure the legitimacy of credit applicants and thus
reduce instances of identity theft.91
4. Civil Remedies
The majority of identity theft victims have attempted to bring claims
against financial institutions under theories of invasion of privacy and
breach of confidentiality.
i. Privacy Claims
Some identity theft victims have attempted to sue financial
institutions under an invasion of privacy theory.' It is generally
accepted that an individual should be able to expect that a financial
institution will keep customer information secure and use it only for
business purposes. 3 Even though an invasion of privacy claim appears
applicable in identity theft situations, courts have been unwilling to
make extensive use of it.94 Usually, invasion of privacy claims fail
86. Id.
87. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (holding that the statute of
limitations began to run when the FCRA was violated even though the victim did not know
that the fraud had occurred).
88. McKelvey, supra note 10, at 1091.
89. Sovern, supra note 6, at 406.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. McKelvey, supra note 10, at 1113.
93. Id. at 1113 n.248.
94. Id. at 1113-14.
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because "most financial institution customers cannot satisfy the
requirement of public dissemination. "' In addition, various judicial
limitations have eroded the effectiveness of invasion of privacy claims in
identity theft cases.96 For example, where a victim's information is
disclosed to only one financial institution, courts have held that an
identity thief does not invade a victim's privacy because he does not
disclose the victim's private information to the public.97 Thus, even
though the theory of invasion of privacy could be applied,98 the theory is
inadequate to deal with the typical identity theft situation where one
identity thief uses the information of one victim exclusively.'
ii. Confidentiality
Another possible remedy for identity theft victim lies in tort, where
victims can sue financial institutions for breaching their duty of
confidentiality.'00 This remedy is based on the premise that financial
institutions are required to keep customer information confidential,
unless authorization to disclose is given by the customer.1 ' Courts have
even been willing to require financial institutions to keep customer
information confidential in situations where there is no explicit
contractual duty due to the customer's vulnerability and reliance on the
financial institution.' 2 Even though the damages available to a victim of
identity theft through a breach of confidentiality claim may seem
adequate,'0 3 courts have yet to conclude that a breach of confidentiality
claim should be applied to an identity theft claim.'O The main reason for
this has been that past cases in which breach of confidentiality has been
applied have involved instances where employees of the financial
institution "intentionally communicated customer information to third
parties."'0 5 Therefore, in situations similar to the example mentioned
earlier in this Comment, °6 in which there is no intentional involvement
95. Id. at 1113.
96. Id. at 1098-99, 1114.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1114.
99. Id. at 1115.
100. Id. at 1102-04.
101. Id. at 1103 n.163.
102. Id. at 1104-07 (citing Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961);
Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982)).
103. Id. at 1111-12.
104. Id. at 1107 n.196.
105. Id. at 1107.
106. See supra Part I.
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by a financial institution employee in the identity theft, a breach of
confidentiality claim could not be used to assist the victim in receiving
restitution.
E. Current Government Responses to Identity Theft
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999107 ("GLB Act") was passed
"to address the need for increased competition in the financial services
industry."'" The GLB Act also addresses the need for privacy in
handling consumer financial information."° The GLB Act's privacy
provisions' prohibit the gathering of consumer information by
pretexting"' and require that financial institutions have "policies,
procedures, and controls in place to prevent the unauthorized disclosure
of customer financial information and to deter and detect fraudulent
access to such information.
' '1
The privacy provision of the GLB Act states "that each financial
institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the
privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of
those customers' nonpublic personal information."" 3 This provision of
the GLB Act has been given effect in three ways."4 First, and most
important, the GLB Act requires that various governmental agencies,
including the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Secretary of the Treasury, "must establish
standards relating to administrative, technical and physical safeguards"
107. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (cited in Edward J. Janger & Paul M.
Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default
Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 n.1 (2002)).
108. Jolina C. Cuaresma, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 497
(2002).
109. Id. Because this Comment is concerned only with identity theft, it will address only
the GLB Act's provisions that deal with consumer financial information privacy.
110. The GLB Act's privacy provisions are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
Michael A. Benoit & Elena A. Lovoy, Update on Consumer Financial Privacy Legislation and
Regulation, 58 BUS. LAW. 1163 n.1 (2003).
111. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
112. Hoar, supra note 19, at 1435.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a).
114. Julia C. Schiller, Comment, Informational Privacy v. The Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Can the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provide Adequate Privacy Protection?, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349, 356 (2003).
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with regard to private customer financial information."5 Second, the
GLB Act requires customer notification before private information can
be disclosed to nonaffiliated third parties. 16 Last, privacy policies must
be disclosed to customers of the financial institutions. 
117
In addition to requiring certain governmental agencies to establish
standards regarding the protection of customer financial information,
the GLB Act also requires these governmental agencies to enforce these
provisions.
However, the mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the GLB
Act are not effective in protecting customers from identity theft. In
particular, the GLB Act requires financial institutions to implement
security measures to protect consumer information,"' but it does not
specify what measures are to be taken or what the penalty would be for
failure to comply with the statute.20 Additionally, "[t]he GLB Act ...
does not provide for a private right of action for consumers to sue the
financial institution[s] directly for violation of the statute. '1 21  Since
consumers have no explicit private cause of action under the GLB Act,
unless the Federal Trade Commission strictly enforces its "Safeguards
Rule,"' 22 it is unlikely financial institutions will be motivated to
implement greater security measures due to the high costs involved with
doing so.123
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the privacy provisions of the GLB Act, see
Therese G. Franz6n & Leslie Howell, Financial Privacy Rules: A Step By Step Guide to the
New Disclosure Requirements Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Implementing
Regulations, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17 (2001).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 6805.
119. Id. § 6801(b).
120. Even though there are no specific guidelines for compliance in the GLB Act, "the
bank and thrift regulatory agencies have issued... joint guidelines for safeguarding
confidential consumer information." Schiller, supra note 114, at 363. However, financial
institutions need only implement methods suggested by the guidelines if they choose to do so.
Id.
121. Id. at 359.
122. The Federal Trade Commission released its Safeguards Rule in May 2002. "The
Safeguards Rule sets forth standards for developing, implementing, and maintaining
reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information handled by all financial institutions
over which the FTC has jurisdiction." Benoit & Lovoy, supra note 110, at 1164. For a
detailed description of the Safeguards Rule's provisions, see id. at 1164-71.
123. Id. at 1170.
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2. Database Breach Notification Security Act (SB 1386)
California has taken a unique approach in hopes of curbing instances
of identity theft. Effective July 1, 2003, the Database Breach
Notification Security Act ("SB 1386") requires that any government
agencies, organizations, or businesses "that do business in California...
promptly notify California 'residents' when they have a reasonable
belief that a system breach [has] occurred which possibly exposed data
subjects' personal information to third parties." ''2 SB 1386 protects a
wide range of consumer information, including SSNs, driver's license
numbers, and bank account numbers and requires notification after
various forms of security breaches, including attacks on computer
networks and the theft of computer hard drives.'25 If a security breach
does occur, SB 1386 requires that notice be given to customers "in the
most expedient time possible" and "without reasonable delay.', 26 If
prompt notice is not given and a customer suffers harm, SB 1386 permits
the harmed customer to have a private cause of action against the
financial institution, and it is predicted that SB 1386 will result in the
creation of class action lawsuits in response to security breaches.'27
While SB 1386 is a desirable piece of legislation in response to the
rise of identity theft, it has its shortcomings and only begins to deal with
the problem of identity theft." One problem with SB 1386 is that its
language is too vague in describing what constitutes a security breach
and when such a breach requires customer notification. 129 This is a
problem because as technology changes and advances, the language of
SB 1386 may not be sufficient to cover most instances of security
breaches. "' Perhaps the most daunting problem with SB 1386, in regard
to victim recovery, is that if a business promptly notifies its customers of
124. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (Deering 2003) (cited in Skinner, supra
note 29, at 3).
125. Cheryl A. Falvey, Disclosure of Security Breaches Required by New California
Privacy Legislation, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Aug. 2003, Northeast
Edition, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. "Microsoft Corp. is being sued in California for failing to adequately secure its
software" in a class action lawsuit under SB 1386. Kevin Murphy, Microsoft Hit with Security
Class Action, 4769 COMPUTERWIRE, Ocr. 3, 2003, at Top Stories; see also Jonathan Krim,
Suit Holds Microsoft Responsible for Worm Holes, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at E05.
128. For a detailed discussion of the problems with SB 1386, see Skinner, supra note 29.
This Comment will discuss only problems that deal most directly with the issue of giving
victims of identity theft a means of recovery.
129. Id. at 32-33.
130. Id.
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a security breach, SB 1386 seems to relieve the business of any liability
for the security breach.1 3' Because SB 1386 limits damages to instances
where the business fails to give notice to the customer for a security
breach, identity theft victims must search for other causes of action to
recover from the business where that business has complied with SB
1386.132
III. RECOGNITION OF NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF IMPOSTOR FRAUD
Because identity theft continues to be a problem133 and past and
current proposals have been inadequate,"3' new responses are required if
the identity theft problem is to be solved. These proposed responses"'
are designed to combat identity theft by allowing victims of identity
theft to sue financial institutions in instances where the financial
institutions' negligence in maintaining adequate computer security
allowed the identity theft to occur. By allowing identity theft victims to
sue for damages, it is theorized that financial institutions will increase
computer security to prevent claims by identity theft victims from
arising. Hopefully, if financial institutions follow this logic and increase
computer security, instances of identity theft will decrease as a result.
Some victims of identity theft have attempted to sue financial
institutions and credit companies under the claim of negligent
enablement of impostor fraud.1 36 Recently, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina decided not to recognize the claim of negligent enablement of
impostor fraud in Huggins v. Citibank.137 The plaintiff in Huggins was
the victim of an unknown identity thief who applied for, and was
granted, credit cards in the plaintiff's name by the defendant bank."3
Huggins claimed that Citibank was negligent in issuing the credit card to
the identity thief because the bank did not corroborate the thief's
identity and because the bank did not have policies in place to check the
identities of applicants.9 In deciding not to recognize the claim of
negligent enablement of impostor fraud, the court followed the
131. Brian P. Brooks, Fallout from Another New Calif Law, THE AMERICAN BANKER,
Aug. 29, 2003, at 11; Skinner, supra note 29, at 55-57.
132. Skinner, supra note 29, at 57.
133. See supra Parts II.A-C.
134. See supra Parts II.D-E.
135. See infra Parts III and IV.
136. Sovern, supra note 6, at 401.
137. 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003).
138. Id. at 276.
139. Id.
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reasoning in Pozer v. TRW, Inc.1' ° In Polzer, the court held that there
was not enough of a relationship between the bank issuing the credit
card and the identity thief or plaintiff to impose a duty of care.141
Therefore, applying the reasoning of Pozer, the court in Huggins held
that there was not enough of a relationship between Huggins and
Citibank to allow a cause of negligent enablement of impostor fraud to
proceed .
Because past proposals to reduce identity theft have failed,143 courts
should begin to recognize the cause of negligent enablement of impostor
fraud in certain instances. Doing so likely Will lead to a reduction of
identity theft. However, in response to the worries stated in Huggins,
' 4
courts should limit the application of this cause of action to instances
where a financial institution is negligent in protecting the financial
information of one of its customers, and this negligence allows an
identity thief to exploit the customer's information to the customer's
detriment.14'5  By requiring an existing customer relationship, the duty
requirement of negligence would be fulfilled,146 yet it would not be
overly broad, thus reducing the concerns of the court in Huggins.
4 7
Therefore, to have an actionable negligent enablement of impostor
fraud claim, one would have to show that an identity thief stole
customer information from a financial institution, that the identity theft
could have been prevented with reasonable security measures,1 4' and
that one of the financial institution's customers was harmed as a result.1
49
140. 256 A.D.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
141. Id.
142. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 277.
143. See supra Part II.
144. See supra Part II.
145. For an example of such a situation, see supra Part I.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (2004).
147. Huggins, 585 S.E.2d at 334.
148. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to propose "reasonable" security measures
necessary to protect customer financial information. The legislative body enacting the statute
should perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine what is reasonable.
149. The four basic elements of a negligence claim are duty, breach, cause, and harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (2004). Normally, the causal link for negligence is
broken by intervening criminal acts. See id. §§ 448-449 (2004). However, since customers
must provide their personal information to financial institutions to do business and are not in
the position to safeguard this information, it should be the responsibility of the financial
institutions to protect customer information. Because identity theft is a well-documented
problem and is on the rise, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text, financial institutions
should expect identity thieves to attempt to gain access to customer information. Therefore,
the intervening criminal acts of an identity thief should not relieve a negligent financial
institution from liability.
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IV. NEGLIGENCE PER SE UNDER THE GLB ACT
Yet another possible way for identity theft victims to seek relief for
damages would be under the GLB Act.15 Since the GLB Act requires
that financial institutions implement certain security measures,' harm
resulting from the violation of the GLB Act could be seen as negligence
per se.'52 By allowing claims under a negligence per se theory, victims
would have an easier time proving negligence because violation of the
security provisions under the GLB Act would be conclusive as to the
financial institution's negligence in implementing a security system.'53 In
addition, a negligence per se cause of action would be beneficial to
financial institutions because they would know how to avoid liability for
instances of identity theft.5  If financial institutions simply comply with
the standards of the GLB Act, they would not be responsible for
instances of identity theft that occur from a security breach under a
negligence per se claim. 5  Therefore, a negligence per se cause of action
not only provides victims with a potential way to receive restitution for
their harm, but it motivates financial institutions to either comply with
the GLB Act or to face potential liability if an actual security breach
occurs.
A negligence per se cause of action would also be beneficial to
victims of identity theft because of the burden such an action would
place on the financial institution. Unlike a cause of action under a
negligent enablement of impostor fraud theory, it would not be the
victim's responsibility to prove that the financial institution lacked the
requisite security measures. Once the government successfully proves
that a financial institution has violated the GLB Act, the violation can
serve as proof of negligence for an identity theft victim's claim against a
financial institution.' Therefore, since identity theft victims would not
have to bear the cost and responsibility of proving that the financial
institutions were negligent with their security measures, claims would be
150. Skinner, supra note 29, at 57 n.196.
151. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-288 (2004).
153. Id.
154. Because a negligence per se claim requires the violation of a statute or other
legislative enactment, a claim would fail without such a violation. Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra Part II.E.1 for a description of security methods required by the GLB
Act.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-288 (2004).
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easier to bring for instances of identity theft. "8 Hopefully the ease with
which identity theft victims could bring suit against financial institutions
that violate the GLB Act would encourage better compliance with the
security measures of the GLB Act and lead to fewer occurrences of
identity theft as a result of weak computer security measures.
V. CONCLUSION
Identity theft is a problem that is growing larger on a yearly basis. "9
While there have been many attempts by legislatures and other
governmental agencies in the past to reduce instances of identity theft,
these attempts have not been very successful."6 In addition, current
government responses to identity theft do not provide the victim with
adequate restitution for the costs that he must incur to correct his
credit.'61 SB 1386 is a good start in placing responsibility on financial
institutions for information security, but it is not enough.'6 2 Therefore,
courts should begin to recognize causes of action against financial
institutions for their negligence in the protection of customer personal
information.'63 By allowing identity theft victims to sue financial
institutions under a negligent enablement of impostor fraud theory or a
negligence per se cause of action when a violation under the GLB Act
occurs, financial institutions will attempt to increase security to avoid
potential liability. Hopefully, this increase in security will lower
instances of identity theft and provide customers with an added feeling
of confidence knowing that their personal information is being guarded
carefully.
ANTHONY E. WHITE
158. The cost of proving negligence would be shifted to the government when a
violation of the GLB Act by a financial institution is alleged. Since the government has more
resources and clout than an individual victim of identity theft, one could assume that the
government is in a better position than an identity theft victim to prove a financial
institution's negligence.
159. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. Instances of identity theft continue to
be a major problem as evidenced by the recent ChoicePoint security breach where nineteen
billion public records were put at risk and tens of thousands of individuals were affected. See
Senate Committee to hold hearings on identity theft, at http://www.cnn.com/2OO5/ALL
POLITICS/02/24/congress.identitytheft.ap/index.html. This Comment went to press as this
story first arose; however, the ChoicePoint situation only reaffirms the author's beliefs as
stated in this Comment.
160. See supra Part II.
161. See supra Part II.E.
162. See supra Part II.E.2.
163. See supra Parts III and IV.
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